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ADDRESS OF SENATOR STROM THURMOND (D-SC) TO HARDWOOD PLYWOOD
INSTITUTE CONVENTION, SHOREHAM HOTEL, WASHINGTON D.C.,
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I am partic~larly honored /4o have the opportunity to address
you ladies and gentlemen of the Hardwood Plywood Instituteh or a
number of reasons.
First, I have attended your annual banquets for the past few
year~nd I have always been impressed by your selection of speakers.
Those I have heard/4ave been dedicated to the preservation of our
free enterprise system/against the insidious forces of collectivism.
I may not have much else in common with your preii.ous speakers,
but I do share their concernA or the grave threat which creeping
collectivism pose:/to our freedom of initiative and our individual
liberties.

As a member of the United States Senate, I shall

continue to fight these forces/which are bent on throwing our
people into the socialist and communist slave camp
internal erosion of our government

through the

nd, ultimately, the destruction

of our liberties.
Second,:.

I realize full well the importance of our hardwood

plywood industryfi o my State of South Carolina, our national
economy, and our defense program.

I shall not stand idly by/while

the State Department offers up this vital industry/ as a sacrifice
on the altar of foreign policy/by maladministration of the so-called
reciprocal trade program.
There can be nothing reciprocal about the administration of
a program/ which permits more than 50 per cent of

OU"

domestic

plywood markets/ to be taken over by foreign low-wage competitors.
The free-trade program/was never intended to be used as an
instrument of foreign policy.

Furthermore, ..the father of the

Trade Act, Cordell Hull, and all Administrations which have been
responsible for our trade programftiave contended that it should
not cause harm to any domestic industry.
I am presently working on legislation/ that will carry out
the original intention of the Trade Actfaithout· the opportunity
for maladministration.

In the meantime, I hope that several of the

recommendations o-f our Special Textile Subcommittee/of the
Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee
.
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ill have some helpful

effects on your case/ now pending before the Tariff Commission.

In

our report, which was unanimously approved by the full committee,
we recommended import quotas, more realistic interpretatm n
of the peril-point provision of the Trade Act, and faster action
on escape-clause cases brought before the Tariff Commission.
After reading your brief which was submitted to the Commission,
I feel you have set out an excellent case for relief/4nder the
escape clause provision of the Trade Act.

If you should be

forced to come to the Congress/because of unfavorable action by
the Administration, I shall exert every effort to assist you/ in
seeking a reversal of the action of the President.

The provision

which provides for the appeal to the Congress/i s not realistic.
The Congress should have approved, in the 1958 Trade Extension
Act, the Kerr-Thurmond amendment which was added to the bill by
the Senate Finance Committee.

Our amendment would have placed

the burden of appealing to the Congress/4n the President, instead
of an industry /such as hardwood plywood, which does not possess
the power or influence of the President fi n legislative matters.
At this point I wish to express my appreciation to Mr. Bob
Hawes and Mr. Bob ~ f ior the assistance and support they
have given me) in my efforts to get relief, or some means of
obtaining relief, for the plywood industry.
helpful/o n the Kerr-Thurmond

amendment.

They were particularly

There is another

gentleman in your industry who deserves much praise for his diligent
efforts A.n behalf of our amendment.

Mr. Walter St,illey of

Conway, South Carolina, endangered his health to come to Washington,
and appeared with me before the Finance Committee, in order to
help us win in the Finance Committee/4y a vote of 8-7.
I shall not dwell further/ on the problems of your industry.
I.2..u know them/ far better than I.
There are two things which I would like to briefly discuss
with you this afternoon.
Federal fiscal policy.

They are National Defense and our
Each is, of course, affected by the other,

and both are crucial in our struggle for survival.

Let me say

initially, that a strong National Defense and a sound fiscal
policy,/4.re not inconsistent, nor are they alternative choices.
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I do not believe that there is anyone, either in the Congress,
the Administration or in the military establishment, who does not
agree / that we should maintain an adequate defense force.

It is

the question of what constitutes an adequate defense/on which
-opinions vary.

I use the term "vary" advisedly, rather than the

term "differ", for I am convinced that whatever conflict of
opinion exists, is one only of degree.
T~e questions which perplex those responsible for defense

needs, and indeed, all Americans, are of magnified perplexity /
because of the consciousness of the very life and death struggle
which hangs on the outcome of our decisi~mso

Whatever complacency

may have existed; 's to the communists' aims for world conquest and
dominatmnpiave, or certainly should have, been dispelled/ in the
minds of objective appraisers by the reprehensible conduct of
communist nations in the past decade.

For every promise which

they make, there are two threats; for every agreement, without
exception, there is a breacho

Whatever may be our variations of

opinions as to the oppositions' strength, no one will deny that
it is more than sufficie nt ,k, o pose an immediate and ever-present
1

threat to our continued existence.
In seeking to reach a proper balance of our defense
structure, we realize the necessity of providing forces / to meet
at least two types of eventualities.

One is an all-out global war,

and the other is a limited conflict, perhaps better called an
aggression with limited aims.

In providing for each, we must

consider our policy--insofar as we are given a choice in any
particular situation--as to what aggression we will deal with in
a limited manner, and what aggression against which~ e are
prepared to unleash our ultimate destructive powero

On this

policy/ rests the initial determination of our balance of forces.
Such policy decision must be dictated, in view of the enemies'
superiority in manpower strength, by the area and magnitude of
conflict/ in which we can maintain an advantage in tactical force /
through superior organization, training, equipment and ability of
the individual soldier.

This determination is necessarily subject

to change, as dictated by the many developments in the cold war
and technology.
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It is obviouo that this initial policy decis:io iy'h as more
influence on the size and composition of forces /4esigned to meet
an aggression of limited aims, than on the for,e designed as a
deterrent to world conflicto

Our deterrent, or retaliatory

strength--as the case may be--must be sufficient for the purpose
at all times.

In this regard, I do not believe that the members

of the military establishment /would testify of their belief in
its sufficiency/ if they did not believe it so.
complete faith in their military ability.

I, also, have

It follows that I

subscribe to the view that the Administration has not requested
a level of defense forces below the minimum necessary for adequate
jefense.
Nevertheless, I do !lQl believe that the Administration 7 s
budget requests for defense /are sufficient.

It will not be waste

to provide a margin of safety against the probability of human
error, or even the unknown of our enemies' strength, in this area
on which our very survival depends.

There must not be left any

room for even a shadow of a doubt / in our own minds, and especially
the minds of our adversaries, that our retaliatory power is
capable in every circumstance, of complete annihilation of the
enemy/ if such be necessary.
There are several areas in which I believe we should expand /
on the Administration's defense proposals.

The first is by

providing sufficient funds / to insure the ability of the Strategic
Air Command to maintain /at least / a reasonable portion of its
force on constant air alert.

For so long as we rely on a manned

bomber force k s an integral part of our retaliatory striking
power, we must take whatever steps are necessary to insure that an
enemy's advantage / from the opening blow of war /will not destroy
our manned bomber force on the ground.

The very fact that we

have planes in the air will have a certain deterrent effect.
Second, it is my belief that we should move much faster with
production of second generation missiles.

This includes

inter-continental missiles, the intermediate range polaris
system, and particularly the anti-missile missiles.

I realize

that the ICBM 9 s which we can produce now /may very soon be obsolete.

- 4 -

I hope they will.

But at each level of development, we must

provide for t,he interim be.fore we reach the next staga, for our
intelligence estimates do not tell us when the enemy will strike-
this being a human factoro

If we permit such a thing as ''a time

before we :· are ready", that will be the day the enemy strikes.
Our greatest defensive weapon hope lies in the development
of anti-missile missiles.

This weapon is badly needed to balance

our retaliatory forces, and their perfection should be pushed as
rapidly as funds can be absorbed into the program.
Third, we must devote enough resources to our ground forces /
to enable them to deal effectively with aggression of limited aims,
or the so-called "brush wars."

Once again, the bare minimum is not

sufficient; and I, for one, am willing to spend the necessary
money for more and better equipped ground forces.

If more of these

wars of limited areas are to occur--and we must presume that they
will--we should be prepared to immediately deploy the maximum
force which can be utilized in the operation, without the delay
attendant upon a mobilization of reserves.

Not only should we

move at once /4 o modernize the arms and equipment of the ground units,
but we should also provide the means to transport them rapidly/
to the areas inwiich they are needed.
While providing an adquate defense, we must be ever aware
that the principal hope of the communists, as repeatedly expressed
in their philosophical treatises and statements of their leaders,
is for victory without their having fired a shot, or receiving one.
If we continue our irresponsible fiscal policy, typified by
increased deficit spending, their hope will surely be fulfilled.
This, truly, is our greatest danger, for wiile our people, in and
out of public office, are aware of the danger of armed attack,
we are not nearly. so unanimous/in our awareness of the threat of
internal collapse from government spending fond the resulting
inflation.
In ~he last 20 years, the Federal budget has grown to nearly
seven times its 1939 size.

In that same period, we have operated

the Federal Government within a balanced budget only five years,
or one-fourth of the time.

Last year, fiscal 195f , saw the deficit
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climb to a new pea~e-time high of almost $13 billion.
the already astronomical size of the debt, this was
4.6 per cent.

Despite
an addition of

The debt is now approximately $283 billion, and

even if we were to begin systematically paying it off/at the rate
of $2,830 million per year, it would take 100 years to complete
payment,
The public debt has reached such staggering proportions,
that the ordinary person finds the figures almost incomprehensible.
But were an attempt made to collect even last year's deficit, the
realization would be brought home with an impact ; for to collect
in one year the $12.e billion we went in the hole in fiscal 19,57,
would require the confiscation of all personal incomes in excess of
$4,000.
One direct result of deficit spending is readily understandable
to all. That is the pinch of inflation.

For example, to maintain

equal purchasing power, one who earned $2,000 in 1939/4ust now
earn $4,806.

One who earned $5,000 in 1939/ must earn $1) ~604,

and one whose income in 1939 was $10,000, must now earn $30,971 /
to maintain indentical purchasing power.
Not only has deficit spending by the Federal Government been
responsible for inflation, but the cycle has run the circle, so
that inflation itself is making further deficit spending /even more
dangerous than it has been in the past.

There is a growing

reluctance A. o lend money to the Federal Government/at any rate
of interest.

This is well-illustrated by the fact /4 hat in the

Treasury Department's latest debt refinancing attempt, the
attrition rate has increased to 22 per cent, as compared tO) the
normal 10 per cent.

The obligations which were sought to be

refinanced/bore interest rates of one and seven-eighths, and two
and one-half per cent, and the offer was to renew them with
securities paying three and three-quarters and four per-! cent.

No

realist can doubt, that in the absence of inflation, there would
have been much less than the normal 10 per cent rejection of the
offer at these substantially increased rates of interest.

This

illustrates that the rate of inflation is in excess, by far, of
the prevailing interest rates.

Investors and savers have by

now been thoroughly impressed by the disastrous results of
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investing in fixea-income securities.

The current round of

Government borrowing was necessitated by the maturity of $9.1
billion of debt obligations.

The sum sought to be borrowed to

cover the attrition is $1.5 billion.

Lest we console ourselves

with the thought that it could be more, we should remember that
during this year a total of $42 billion of Government securities
will fall due.
It is obvious that as far as borrowing is concerned, we are
nearing the end of our rope.

It will be extremely difficult,

to continue securing private funds for refinancing the existing
debt.

Even if we manage to hold the debt at its present level, it

is also evident that unless inflation is checked immediately, the
Congress will be faced with an increase in the statutory interest
ceiling, passed in 1918, of four and one-quarter per cent on
National debt securities.
There are those who would rely on a hoped-for increase/ in
our gross national product, and the increased government revenue
resulting therefrom, to remedy the impasse with which we are faced.
The same people would hold the line ontaxes and, in some cases,
increase them.

An increase in gross national product will

und·ewtedly help, and I fervently hope that those who predict
an eight per cent increase/ will have their prognosis justified.
As a realist, however, I cannot forget /that the only year in which
there has been an increase in gross national product of eight
per cent feas following 1954's 7.5 billion-dollar tax cut.
Additionally, in all candor, we must admit that a measurement of
gross national product increase, when measured in dollars, has a ,
built-in inflation factor;
As much as I would like to see our fiscal problems painlessly
solved A,y a big increase in national product, to place any reliance
in what is essentially wishful thinking, would be an expansion ·
of our fiscal irresponsibility.
To some of you, it may appear, from what I have said, that
we must choose between providing adequate defense k nd eliminating
deficit spending.
obtainable.,

I repeat, they are not inconsistent--both are

We can reduce overall spending drastically/ without

endangering our defense policy.

This is illustrated by the fact
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that defense spending for 1959/4111 be $4.3 billion lower than
the 1953 Korean war defense budget, while non-defense expenditures
for 1959/are estimated at $9.2 billion above the 1953 levelo
Also, non-defense spending for fiscal 1959A.s to be increased by
$5.9 billion, against an increase of only $2 billion fordefense
purposes.
Spending can be cut without injury to our defense posture /
by reducing such items, among others, as foreign aid, public
housing and urban renewal, by declining to enter the fields of
community facilities and area redevelopment with Federal aid,
and ·by rejecting any increase in Federal aid to education.

Even

desirable programs should be postponed/until Federal expenditures
can be reduced well within our income.

Special interest groups /

must not be allowed to sap the strength from our free enterprise
system, regardless of their attempts to increase their doles/from
the United States Treasury and the taxpayers' pockets.
Both the national defense/4nd the curtailment of non-defense
spending/are matters that must be put above partisan politics,
for the consequences of failure/are too dreadful t
consideration except the country's welfare.

I can assure

that Congress is still most responsive to public opinion, and
our efforts to defend ourselves/from both armed attack and bank
ruptcy/can only be achievedAf they have the solid support of
the American public.

- END -
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